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Leaving Home: An Institutional Perspective on Intermediary HQ Relocations 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the effect of changing national institutions on relocations of intermediary HQs. 
Using a dataset of 154 cross-border relocations between the period from 2000-2015, we draw on the 
intermediary HQ’s middle position within the MNC and investigate how a decrease in institutional 
quality in the HQ’s host country and a change in institutional distance between different MNC units 
affect the relocation decision. Our findings advance the emergent literature on HQ relocations as 
well as our knowledge of intermediary HQs and the effect of changing institutions on 




HQ relocation; intermediary headquarters; institutional quality; ICRG; institutional distance; 
national governance system. 
 





Recently, multinational corporations (MNCs) have started to increasingly unbundle their 
headquarters (HQ) activities (also referred to as parenting activities, Goold & Campbell, 1991) and 
to disperse them geographically (Desai, 2009; Laamanen, Simula, & Torstila, 2012; Baaij & 
Slangen, 2013). Several studies have observed an increase in the cross-border relocations of not 
only individual activities (Birkinshaw, Braunerhjelm, Holm, & Terjesen, 2006) but also entire HQs 
(Benito, Lunnan, & Tomassen, 2011; Laamanen et al., 2012; Baaij, Mom, Van den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2015). To this end, the “World Investment Report” (UNCTAD, 2003) identified an 
emerging market for HQs. 
Despite these recent advancements, the literature on HQ relocations is still in its infancy 
compared to the work on the relocation (offshoring) of regular value chain activities (Baaij et al., 
2015; Nell, Kappen, & Laamanen, 2017). Granted, the rec nt focus on HQ relocations has produced 
valuable results. For example, firm-specific variables, such as the age or size of HQ units as well as 
the ownership structure, have been found to affect the likelihood of relocation (Benito et al., 2011; 
Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Forsgren, Holm, & Johanson, 1995; Laamanen et al., 2012). Similarly, 
differences in wages or corporate taxes, proximity to big cities, and agglomeration benefits have 
been reported to be relevant for location choices (Baaij et al., 2015; Barner-Rasmussen, Piekkari, & 
Björkman, 2007; Benito et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Laamanen et al., 2012). However, 
while some authors have investigated institutional factors as the potential antecedents of HQ 
relocation (Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Benito et al.,2011; Laamanen et al., 2012), we still have limited 
insight into how country institutions and, specifically, institutional change influence HQ relocation 
decisions.  
Furthermore, the previous studies have focused evenless on intermediary HQs and how 
they are affected by institutions and institutional change (Zhou, 2015). This is unsatisfactory as 
many MNCs operate with multi-layered hierarchies that include intermediary HQs such as regional 
or divisional HQs in addition to one or more corporate HQs (Nell et al., 2017; Birkinshaw, Ambos, 
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& Bouquet, 2017). In addition, the scarce evidence se ms to indicate that intermediary HQs are 
more mobile than corporate ones (Laamanen et al., 2012) and that institutional conditions are also 
relevant for their location choice. For example, Starbucks, the American coffee company, moved its 
European HQ from Amsterdam to London in 2014 (Aglionby & Houlder, 2014); General Electric, 
the American multinational conglomerate, relocated i s Renewable Energy Business HQ from the 
US to Paris in 2015 (Rulison, 2015); and, more recently, several MNCs (e.g., EasyJet, LG 
Electronics or VTB Group) announced that they had already left or planned to leave the UK with 
their intermediary HQs due to increased institutional uncertainty resulting from Brexit and the 
potential loss of EU passporting rights (Rodionova, 2016). In this regard, intermediary HQs offer 
unique insights into the relevance of institutions as their characteristic middle position in-between 
corporate and local units can be leveraged.  
In this paper, we therefore focus on intermediary HQs and how institutions influence the 
likelihood of their relocation across borders. By using the term intermediary HQ relocation, we 
refer to the relocation of divisional or regional HQs. We define divisional HQs as entities that are 
“responsible for a functional activity or for a specific group of units performing similar activities” 
(Dellestrand, 2011, p. 231), whereas regional HQs are "HQs that administer a firm's regional 
activities across multiple countries" (Laamanen et al., 2012, pp. 188).  
We develop and test hypotheses on the effects of institutional change using a hand-collected 
dataset of 154 intermediary HQ relocations over a period of 16 years from 2000 to 2015. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the largest dataset on cross-border HQ relocations. We find that a 
decrease in the institutional quality of the host country of an intermediary HQ increases the 
likelihood that the HQ will be relocated. Furthermore, we find that the institutional distance 
between corporate and intermediary HQ location influences the relocation decision. Increasing 
institutional distance makes the intermediary HQ “stickier”. We do not find support for our 
hypothesis that increasing institutional distance between the intermediary HQ and the local 
subsidiaries increase the likelihood of relocation. 
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Our study contributes in a number of ways. First, the focus on national institutions and 
institutional distance advances our understanding of the HQ relocation phenomenon (Laamanen et 
al., 2012; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2007; Benito et al., 2011). We provide 
additional, complementary explanations of why HQ relocations occur. We show how intermediary 
HQs are sensitive to the institutional changes of hst countries as well as to changes in the 
institutional distance between host- and home countries. While new to the HQ relocation literature, 
our findings also extend, on a more general level, the work on offshoring of high-value-adding 
functions such as R&D (Bertrand & Mol, 2013; Lewin, Massini, & Peeters, 2009; Demirbag & 
Glaister, 2010). 
Second, we contribute to the literature that links institutional theory to governance choices 
(Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 2004; Brouthers, 2002; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; Driffield, 
Mickiewicz, & Temouri, 2016; Meyer & Peng, 2005). We demonstrate that change in national 
institutional systems affects firm strategic choices such as HQ relocations. We argue that this occurs 
because institutional change influences an HQs’ ability to draw on its ownership advantages. To 
this end, institutional change is a relevant factor b th in terms of changing host country conditions 
and changing distances between the home- (corporate HQ location) and host country of the 
intermediary HQ. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on HQ-subsidiary relationships within MNCs. Those 
studies “have largely focused on the MNC headquarters–subsidiary dyads and overlooked the 
intermediary supervisory units” (Zhou, 2015, p. 280). In this paper, we go beyond the mother-
daughter structure of MNCs (Kogut & Zander, 1995) and shed more light on the internal 
complexity of HQ systems and the role played by intermediary HQs. We show that MNCs consider 
a multitude of factors when relocating intermediary HQs. They specifically consider the evolution 
of institutional distance between the locations of their corporate HQs and their intermediary HQs.  
This paper also offers policy and managerial implications. Our results empirically support 
the idea that institutional quality and its dynamics have a significant effect on relocation decisions. 
 
 5
Thus, national institutions and their (relative) development are relevant in attracting and retaining 
HQs. Policy makers may want to continuously improve the quality of their country institutions and 
monitor those of competing locations. MNC managers are advised to not only consider cost factors 
(such as taxation) but also the institutional setup and its dynamics when deciding about HQ 
relocation. On a more general level, MNC managers might profit from our empirical support for the 
idea that intermediate HQs have indeed become quite mobile and that a number of firms try to 





“ Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interactions” (North, 1991, p.97). They consist of formal rules (such as laws and property rights) as 
well as informal norms of behaviour (e.g., cultural v ues). These rules vary across countries, and 
they are therefore of substantial importance for internationalizing firms and multinational 
corporations. In this study, we focus on formal institutions.  
Formal institutions define the “rules of the game” and influence the transaction and 
production costs of firms. For example, high quality institutions help firms grow and develop 
(Thomas, 2009; Zhou, 2015). Countries with high quality institutions (i.e., a legal system that is 
transparent, impartial, and effective; public institutions that are honest as well as credible; and 
policies that support competition and openness to international trade) can be characterized by lower 
levels of uncertainty for economic activities, as the business environment is easier to decipher 
(Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). In addition, efficient judicial systems increase the incentive for 
firms to invest in research and development as their innovations are better protected (Kumar, Rajan, 
& Zingales, 2001), and well-developed financial markets support firms with financial resources. As 
a consequence, formal institutions co-determine the feasibility and profitability of doing business in 
a certain country (North, 1991). 
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Many international business scholars have therefore inv stigated the effects of institutional 
quality, for example, on MNC location and governance decisions for their international affiliates 
(Alvarez & Marin, 2010; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Hernandez & Nieto, 2015; Kwok & 
Tadesse, 2006). For instance, there is evidence that MNCs to some extent avoid institutionally weak 
contexts (Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013)1. Firms also pick ownership modes that help 
safeguard against some institutional risks (Slangen & van Tulder, 2009), or they staff foreign 
affiliates with expatriates or third-country nationals to keep corruption at bay (Muellner, Klopf, & 
Nell, 2017).  
Collectively, the previous research has made good progress in understanding national 
corporate governance systems and institutions and their influence on MNC affiliates. However, the 
previous work has focused less on how national institutions affect organizational units higher in 
firm hierarchies such as corporate or intermediary HQs.  
 
MNC structures 
MNC organizations have traditionally been described as mother-daughter structures (Kogut 
& Zander, 1995), and there is a substantial body of work on “headquarters-subsidiary relationships” 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Only recently has there be n greater emphasis on intermediary units in 
the hierarchy of MNCs such as divisional or regional HQs (e.g., Lehrer & Asakawa, 1999; Enright, 
2005; Schotter, Mudambi, Doz, & Gaur, 2017; Hoenen, Nell, & Ambos, 2014; Mahnke, Ambos, 
Nell, & Hobdari, 2012; Zhou, 2015)2.  
Focusing on intermediary HQs acknowledges that MNCs often operate with multilayer 
hierarchical organizations. In MNCs, corporate HQ managers and corporate-level units (such as 
corporate staff) are exposed to high degrees of diversity and complexity in the MNC network (Wolf 
& Egelhoff, 2002). The limited cognitive ability and attention of corporate level staff (Bouquet & 
                                                        
1 Of course, they do not shun such destinations entirely because many arbitrage opportunities (e.g., lower labor costs) 
correlate with weaker institutional contexts. 
2 There is related work on „middle management“, for example by Wooldridge and Floyd (1990; 1992). However, this 
work usually does not consider formal institutions and is rather oriented towards managerial questions. 
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Birkinshaw, 2008) mean that tasks of control and supervision are frequently delegated to 
intermediary units when MNCs grow (Verbeke & Kenworthy, 2008). These intermediary 
hierarchical units then take over some parenting tasks from the corporate HQs and they become “de 
facto” parents for frontline subsidiaries (Goold & Campbell, 2002; Beugelsdijk, Nell, & Ambos, 
2017).  
Intermediary HQs are thus “hybrid” units (Lehrer & Asakawa, 1999) that play a double role 
within MNCs: they are agents for corporate HQs and parents for the operational subsidiaries under 
their responsibility. They help with information processing between frontline subsidiaries and 
corporate HQs (Nell, Ambos, & Schlegelmilch, 2011; Zhou, 2015), and they can also be understood 
as two-way channels of communication or brokers that are related to the MNC as a whole and to the 
subsidiary environment (Hoenen et al., 2014). They translate corporate strategies and goals into 
local ones (Forsgren et al., 1995; Chakravarty, Hsieh, Schotter, & Beamish, 2017), and they help 
promote and leverage local strategic initiatives within the MNC network (Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1998). 
Furthermore, they dispose of the specific decision r ghts that are allocated to them by the 
corporate HQs (Mahnke et al., 2012; Piekkari, Nell, & Ghauri, 2010; Lunnan & Zhao, 2014; 
Kähäri. Saittakari, Piekkari, & Barner-Rasmussen, 2017). For example, divisional HQs usually have 
decision rights for a certain product range, regional HQs for a range of geographic markets (Wolf & 
Egelhoff, 2002). With this formal authority, intermediary HQs set priorities in case of uncertainty 
among affiliates (Hart & Moore, 2005), solve conflicts (and avoid the escalation of conflict to 
higher hierarchical levels) (Poppo, 2003; Decreton, Dellestrand, Kappen, & Nell, 2017; Decreton, 
Nell, & Stea, 2018), perform input and output contrl tasks on behalf of the corporate HQs 
(Kostova, Nell, & Hoenen, 2016), and help coordinate the interdependent activities of the affiliates 
for which they are responsible (Nell et al., 2011).  
The research on intermediary HQs has made great progress. However, while there has been 
some emphasis on the initial location choice for such nits (e.g., Belderbos, Du, & Goerzen, 2017), 
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much less work has been done on the relocation of existing units. In this paper, we particularly 
focus on the relocation of intermediary HQs. The scarce evidence on intermediary HQ relocations 
show that, while corporate HQs are quite sticky (Meyer & Benito, 2016), intermediary HQs are 
relatively mobile (Laamanen et al., 2012; Benito et al., 2011).  
Unit-specific (e.g., the HQ’s size) and MNC-level characteristics (e.g., the degree of 
internationality) seem to influence the relocation likelihood of intermediary HQs (Birkinshaw et al., 
2006; Benito et al., 2011; Laamanen et al., 2012). However, few studies have investigated country-
specific variables such as national governance systems and institutions (Baaij et al., 2015; Barner-
Rasmussen et al., 2007; Benito et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Laamanen et al., 2012). Using 
the term “supervisory units” for what we call intermediary HQs, Zhou (2015, p. 280) summarizes 
that “the literature missed the most unique dimension of MNC structure: the allocation of formal 
supervisory responsibilities across national borders”.  
Therefore, we develop how change in the national institutional context of an intermediary 
HQ unit affects the likelihood of its relocation. We thereby leverage the unique position of an 
intermediary HQ within the hierarchy of the MNC and differentiate between institutional change in 
the location of intermediary HQs, increasing institutional distance between the corporate and the 
intermediary HQ, as well as increasing institutional distance between the intermediary HQ and the 
affiliates for which the intermediary HQ is responsible. We particularly focus on institutional 
change. In fact, formal institutions do evolve, someti es abruptly, shaping economic growth or 
decline (North, 1991). These changes can more quickly influence managerial decisions compared to 




Headquarters such as corporate and intermediary HQsmu t perform their parenting tasks 
effectively and efficiently (Nell & Ambos, 2013). It has been argued that MNCs frequently allocate 
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supervisory and coordination responsibilities (and thus intermediary HQs) to countries with 
relatively good institutions (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Zhou, 2015). For example, when Procter 
& Gamble was searching for the right location for its Global Business Services HQ in 2001, it 
chose Costa Rica due to its high quality institutions compared to alternative locations such as 
Mexico (Luxner, 2001; Zhou, 2015). There are several r sons for such behaviour. 
The first important aspects are the availability of information and information processing 
capabilities of the intermediary HQ both of which are influenced by national institutions (Ali & 
Crain, 2001). Intermediary HQs must make decisions regarding priorities, conflicts, or coordination 
on behalf of the subsidiaries for which they are responsible. Therefore, they try to make sense of 
and synthesize high quality and timely information about many business-related factors. Most of 
this information comes through internal channels from the dispersed subsidiaries, which specialize 
in local information seeking (Cantwell & Santangelo, 1999). However, information stemming from 
the intermediary HQ country can be a valuable comple ent (Zhou, 2015). After all, it is the unique 
advantage of MNCs compared to domestic firms that tey can complement local information with 
information from other parts of their network (Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). Countries with 
high quality institutions are usually characterized by a higher availability of such information from 
the public sector (e.g., consumption or inflation data), other firms (e.g., marketing research), or 
universities (e.g., economic outlooks). Those countries provide more sophisticated markets for 
knowledge, prediction, and interpretation, they posses  clearer disclosure regimes, and they suffer 
from fewer censorship issues (Fiaschi, Giuliani, & Nieri, 2017; North, 1990; Zhou, 2015). 
Furthermore, high quality national education system allow intermediary HQs to recruit staff that 
are well-trained in collecting and interpreting information, and such HQ staff are more willing to 
take on jobs in locations with high quality instituons (Collings, Morley, & Gunnigle, 2008). 
Similar to the offshoring of other higher-value-adding activities (Contractor, Kumar, Kundu, & 
Pedersen, 2010; Demirbag & Glaister, 2010; Lewin et al., 2009; Manning, Massini, & Lewin, 
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2008), intermediary HQs also require locations with a good knowledge infrastructure and access to 
expertise and qualified employees. 
Second, the institutional quality of a country smoothens the process of running HQs. In 
high-quality locations, there is an ample supply of c mplementary service suppliers such as 
accountants and consultants. Furthermore, institutions reduce uncertainty for intermediary HQs. 
High-quality institutions are characterized by lower levels of regulatory unpredictability (Demirbag 
& Glaister, 2010; Hernandez & Nieto, 2015) and a lower risk that the local government will 
establish unfavourable policies towards foreign-owned firms (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 
2005; Slangen & van Tulder, 2009). After all, interm diary HQs are also often foreign-owned 
subsidiaries that suffer from the liability of foreignness. High-quality institutions reduce some of 
these liabilities. For example, good control of corruption and few obstacles to foreign-owned 
businesses reduce problems for intermediary HQs. In addition, property rights influence ownership 
and control rights (North, 1990; Zhou, 2015). When property rights regimes are faulty and arbitrary, 
intermediary HQs must engage in many difficult interactions with different institutional actors 
increasing transaction costs.  
In sum, intermediary units placed in high quality contexts should be better able to possess, 
interpret, and synthesize local information, to employ and retain appropriate staff, and to operate 
smoothly at low transaction- and coordination costs due to lower levels of uncertainty and formal 
institutional hazards. When the intermediary HQ country’s institutional quality decreases, the 
above-described inefficiencies and challenges are realized. In fact, formal institutions can change in 
unfavourable ways quite quickly. Recent examples include the United Kingdom (e.g., Brexit-related 
uncertainty), Turkey, or Poland. In turn, a decrease in institutional quality leads to a search process 
during which the MNC evaluates potential alternative locations that offer better conditions for 
intermediary HQs. For example, the British Airline Company EasyJet relocated its European HQ 
from the UK to Austria after discussions around Brexit (Topham & Sweney, 2017). With the risk of 
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the UK leaving the EU, EasyJet faced high legal uncertainty and would potentially no longer be 
able to operate flights between two EU countries. Therefore, we propose the following: 
 Hypothesis 1: The stronger the decrease in institutional quality in the host country where 
the intermediary HQ is located, the higher the likelihood that the MNC will relocate the 
intermediary HQ to another country.  
 
MNCs are spatially dispersed organizations. By establi hing value-creating and corporate activities 
abroad, they work in different institutional, political, and legal environments, and they interact with 
different institutions. This geographical dispersion exacerbates the need of MNCs to manage the 
distance between corporate HQs and subsidiaries with the aim of reducing inefficiencies 
(Ghemawat, 2001; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Zaheer, 1995). Distance can be defined as “the 
difference between two countries with regard to a particular aspect of social context, such as 
cultural, administrative, economic, linguistic, or institutional” (Kostova et al., 2016, p.13).  
Distance creates major challenges for MNCs, for example, when they attempt to transfer 
knowledge, to manage joint ventures abroad, or to achieve legitimacy in a foreign country (Ambos 
& Ambos, 2009; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). We focus on institutional 
distance, which reflects the differences in the institutional setups between two locations. We 
propose that growing institutional differences over time affect the likelihood that the intermediary 
HQ will be relocated. Due to its intermediary position, there are two relevant types of institutional 
distance: (1) the differences between the corporate HQ and the intermediary HQ location, and (2) 
the differences between the intermediary HQ location and the locations of the subsidiaries for 
which the intermediary HQ is responsible. We start with the latter. 
We argue that increasing institutional distance betwe n the locations of the intermediary HQ 
and the local subsidiaries makes a relocation of the intermediary HQ more likely. Growing 
institutional differences reduce the ability of the intermediary HQ to fulfil a value-adding parenting 
role for its subsidiaries (Beugelsdijk et al., 2017). First, larger institutional differences are usually 
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associated with higher communication and coordinatio  challenges. For example, growing 
differences in the legal system, the rule of law, and important bureaucratic principles and 
regulations require more adaptation of processes and accompanying documents such as reports.  
Second, growing contextual differences also increase the likelihood of conflicts and 
misunderstandings. For example, Kostova et al. (2016, p. 14) argued that subsidiaries “from 
institutionally distant countries are likely to possess and use different information, operate out of 
different cognitive frames and heuristics, and, as a result, have difficulties understanding and 
interpreting HQ’ priorities and requests. This challenges the subsidiary’s correct understanding 
and interpretation of HQ’ objectives and requests”. Similarly, due to increasing differences, the 
correct interpretation of information from local sub idiaries becomes more difficult on the level of 
the HQ. Thus, miscommunication and mutual misinterpretation is likely to reduce the value-added 
of intermediary HQs as the HQs’ unfamiliarity with t e local subsidiary context increases 
(Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012; Beugelsdijk et al., 2017). In such situations, it is more arduous for 
intermediary HQs to aggregate, evaluate, and synthesize information from local subsidiaries and to 
decide on how and in which way corporate strategies and tactics shall be adapted.  
Finally, growing differences make it more likely tha  the intermediary HQ makes 
inappropriate decisions related to the prioritization of tasks or conflicts resulting in detrimental 
effects on the subsidiaries (Brenner & Ambos, 2013; Suchman, 1995). For example, Holm, 
Decreton, Nell, & Klopf (2017) report how HQs misinterpret the subsidiary’s local institutional 
context, which leads to costly and lengthy response processes on the level of the subsidiary. 
Growing differences might also create confusion on h w to proceed and will, consequently, lead to 
inertia in strategic decision processes (Zhou, 2015). 
In sum, increasing institutional distance between intermediary HQs and subsidiaries leads to 
increasing coordination, control challenges and costs. Under such circumstances, the intermediary 
HQ adds less value and loses justification for its existence. In turn, this increases the pressure to 
modify the intermediary HQ’s organizational setup or l cation. Relocating local subsidiaries 
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(instead of the intermediary HQ) is not a valid opti n. The local subsidiaries are located in countries 
for specific reasons (e.g., market-, resource-, or efficiency-seeking motives) other than the 
institutional closeness to the HQ (Dunning, 1981). Therefore, we propose the following: 
 Hypothesis 2: The stronger the increase of institutional distance between the host country of 
the intermediary HQ and the host countries of the loca  subsidiaries, the higher the likelihood that 
the MNC will relocate the intermediary HQ to another country. 
 
We argue that the likelihood of relocation is also influenced by the institutional distance between 
the intermediary HQ and the corporate HQ. In fact, most of the reasoning from Hypothesis 2 is 
similar. Growing contextual differences between thewo HQs make it more difficult for the 
corporate HQ to fulfil its parenting role for the intermediary HQ, there are likely to be more 
conflicts and misunderstandings between the two HQs, and coordination costs as well as adaptation 
costs are likely to increase. Since corporate HQs are quite sticky in general (and responsible for 
other regions and divisions that might pull in other directions), the relocation pressure is on the 
intermediary HQ. 
 However, an intermediary HQ is not simply a subsidiary of the corporate HQ, it is also the 
de facto parent for the subsidiaries in its region or division (Nell & Ambos, 2013). To this end, the 
intermediary HQ exists only if it can perform the value-adding role for frontline subsidiaries better 
than the corporate HQ or if it substantially alleviates the corporate HQ from administrative and 
entrepreneurial tasks. 
 In the ideal scenario, the unique position of the intermediary HQ in-between frontline 
subsidiaries and corporate HQ enables the MNC to profit from region- or division-specific 
information (Lehrer & Asakawa, 1999) and to provide a unique perspective and interpretation based 
on the sensemaking that is performed by the intermediary HQ (Alfoldi, Clegg, & McGaughey, 
2017). As a consequence, to perform their role well, intermediary HQs should possess and use 
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information as well as cognitive schemes and heuristics that are different from those used by other 
units, particularly corporate HQs.  
Converging institutional setups between the corporate and the intermediary HQ locations 
calls into question the intermediary HQ’s raison d’être. If cognitive frames and heuristics are very 
similar, as well as the formal rules of the game, th n the corporate HQ could relatively easily take 
over the parenting tasks itself. Thus, all else being equal, we would expect that increasing 
institutional distance between the intermediary HQ and the corporate HQ location decreases the 
likelihood of intermediary HQ relocation.  
Hypothesis 3: The stronger the increase of institutional distance between the host country of 
the intermediary HQ and the home country (i.e., the location of the corporate HQ), the lower the 
likelihood that MNCs will relocate the intermediary HQ to another country.  
 
Data and Methods 
Data and Sample 
Our analysis focuses on intermediary HQ relocations. Thus, any movements of corporate HQs, 
local subsidiaries or other facilities (e.g., R&D centres) are excluded. We define relocations as the 
processes through which a firm moves its intermediary HQ from one country to another and the HQ 
unit maintains “a degree of continuity in identity” (Laamanen et al., 2012, p. 195). Hence, the 
relocation implies the transfer of the top management team as well as HQ functions. Inversions, i.e., 
relocations that exclusively involve the legal seat of he HQ (Slangen, Baaij, & Valboni, 2017), as 
well as first establishment of HQs (e.g., if a US firm decides to establish its regional HQ in Europe 
for the first time and vice versa) are excluded.  
We focus on Europe-related relocations, i.e., we considered three types of relocation: (1) 
relocation within Europe (e.g., from Germany to Austria), (2) from Europe to any other non-
European country (e.g., from Switzerland to Singapore), and (3) from any other non-European 
country to Europe (e.g., from the US to the UK). However, we excluded the latest members of the 
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EU (Bulgaria and Romania) because of the lower avail bility of high-quality information in those 
countries. 
The hypotheses are tested on a hand-collected multi-co ntry sample of relocations. We 
started by identifying the population of all intermediary HQs in 27 European countries (EU-25 plus 
Norway and Switzerland) during a 16-year period from 2000 to 2015 in the Orbis database, which 
contains extensive financial and ownership information. Since relocation events are relatively rare 
and concentrated in larger companies with internatio l operations (Laamanen et al., 2012; Benito 
et al., 2011), we first retrieved the top quintile of all MNCs in Europe according to turnover in the 
Orbis database from 2000 to 2015. We then used the Orbis data on financial reporting and 
ownership as well as on legal entity names (e.g., “Henkel Central Eastern Europe”) to clearly 
distinguish intermediary HQs from frontline subsidiaries. We cross-checked these data with annual 
reports where available. With this approach, we arrived at a total sample of 3,467 intermediary 
HQs.  
As a second step, we followed Laamanen et al. (2012) and identified HQ relocations on the 
basis of the news database “LexisNexis”. For each intermediary HQ in our sample, we collected all 
news and newspaper articles in LexisNexis over the entire time period in three languages (English, 
Italian, and German). We carefully checked all articles for announced or realized HQ relocations. 
We paid attention to the issue of potential false positives in the sampling by going through another 
news database called “Factiva” and through several other sources of information, i.e., stock market 
notifications, local business press, and Google news. Our extensive research in the abovementioned 
data sources also helped us in reducing the problem of potential false negatives. However, we are 
aware that the sample presumably does not include all r levant relocation events. It considers only 
relocations from larger companies that are important enough to be mentioned by those documents 
and news that we processed. Nevertheless, the covered documents come from a wide range of 
sources and have been searched in multiple languages, nd our sample is considerably larger than 
 
 16
those of previous studies (for example, Laamanen et al. (2012) covered only 52 relocations). 
Following this sampling procedure, we identified 154 relocations of intermediary HQs3.  
 
Measures 
The dependent variable is the decision to relocate an intermediary HQ across countries. In line with 
Laamanen et al. (2012), the dependent variable is measured as a dichotomous variable, which takes 
the value 1 for relocation and 0 otherwise.  
The first independent variable is the absolute decrease in institutional quality of the 
intermediary HQ location. We use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measures, and 
following Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, & Siegel (2014), we measure institutional quality through the 
components ‘Law and Order’ (scale from 0 to 6), ‘Bureaucracy Quality’ (scale from 0 to 4), and 
‘Corruption’ (scale from 0 to 6). Higher values in the dimensions correspond to better country 
performance. Those measures are particularly suitable to our study as they are forward-looking 
based on the assessment of executives and proved to be predictive of risk realizations (Bekaert et 
al., 2014). We measure the three components individually on the intermediary HQ country-level 
and apply a factor analysis. Depending on the number of lagged years (e.g., one year before the 
observation of a relocation, three years before obsrvation, etc.), we obtain different factor loadings 
for our individual measures; however, all factor loading are above 0.8 and produce a single 
construct with a Cronbach α>0.7. We capture the change in institutional quality over a three-year 
period (i.e., one year before relocation compared to three years before relocation) and log-transform 
the absolute values of the decreases in institutional quality. Increases in institutional quality were 
set to 0 to test the hypothesized directionality (H1). Robustness tests were done with a change 
variable over a 5-year period. 
                                                        
3 We also found five multiple relocations, i.e., when the same firm relocates the same HQ unit more than once. We kept 
those observations in the dataset. 
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The second independent variable is the measure of distance. We operationalize this variable 
through the increase in institutional distance from the intermediary HQ to the subsidiaries (H2) and 
to the corporate HQ (H3). Consistent with the operation lization of H1, we again draw on the ICRG 
indicators and measure the institutional quality of the subsidiary and corporate HQ countries. For 
the former, we create the weighted average of institutional quality for the subsidiaries under the 
control of the intermediary HQ. The weight corresponds to the number of subsidiaries that are 
located in each country. We create the measure of institutional distance by subtracting the average 
institutional quality of the subsidiary countries from the intermediary HQ country and the 
institutional quality of the intermediary HQ country f om the corporate HQ country. The change in 
institutional distance is again measured over a three-year period (i.e., one year before relocation 
compared to three years before relocation), and we log-transform all increases in institutional 
distance. Decreases in institutional distance were s t to 0 to test the hypothesized directionality (H2
and H3).  
To control for alternative explanations, we included a wide range of controls. On the 
intermediary HQ country-level, we include the absolute level of institutional quality one year before 
the relocation, as previous studies (e.g., Zhou, 2015) have shown that intermediary HQs are more 
likely to be located in countries with high instituonal quality. Additionally, we control for 
corporate tax and employment rates, which are measured as the log-transformed rates on  year 
before the relocation. The variable GDP per capita is measured in log-transformed US Dollar (2010 
PPPs) one year prior to relocation and reflects the overall development level of a country. 
At the level of the MNC, we control for the overall MNC size measured as the log-
transformed number of employees, as larger MNCs might relocate intermediary HQs more often. 
Furthermore, as shown in the previous studies, a possible alternative explanation for HQ relocations 
is related to the degree of internationalization of the MNC. It is measured as the ratio between the 
amount of exports and the total amount of revenues g nerated by the firm (Sullivan, 1994). 
Moreover, since the relocation decision could be a consequence of M&A operations, we create a 
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control variable (M&A Activity) for that. We also control for the ownership concentration of the 
MNC. It is measured as the percentage of voting share  held by shareholders. We identify two main 
categories: concentrated ownership, where one shareholder owns more than 20% of the total shares 
(given the value of 1); and dispersed ownership, where no single shareholder holds more than 20% 
of the total shares (value of 0). Lastly, we control for the industry. We use the SIC system’s first 
digit of the code. We merged industries ‘8’ and ‘9’ due to the limited number of observations in 
those industries. 
At the HQ-level, we control for the HQ size which can be an indicator for the number of 
performed parent activities and the importance of the unit within the MNC. It is measured as the 
log-transformed number of employees. In addition, we control for the different types of 
intermediary HQs. They can either take over a regional responsibility as a regional HQ or a 
product- or function-related responsibility as a divisional HQ. The variable takes the value 1 for 
regional HQs and 0 for divisional HQs. We also contr l for imitative behaviour by other MNCs. 
We use the operationalization of Laamanen et al. (2012, p. 200) for this trend variable counting “the 
number of relocation events in the year prior to the firm-year observation”. Finally, we control for 
geographic distance between the intermediary HQ and the corporate HQ as well as the subsidiaries. 
For the intermediary HQ – corporate HQ distance, we tak  the simple log-transformed geographic 
distance measure as compiled by Berry, Guillén, & Zhou (2010). For the intermediary HQ – 
subsidiary distance, we follow Laamanen et al. (2012) and calculate the geographical distance as 
the sum of logarithms of geographical distances betwe n the country of the intermediary HQ and 
the countries of each subsidiary. We then divide the result by the number of subsidiaries.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
In line with Laamanen et al. (2012), the highest relocation activity occurs in Central and Western 
Europe: Switzerland is one of the most attractive European countries for HQ units, gaining 44 HQs 
between 2000 and 2015, while losing only 11 in the same period of time. The UK, however, gained 
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24 HQ units but also lost 37 HQs. Similarly, the Netherlands and France lost 12 and 10 HQs, 
respectively, over the observed 16 years. Germany and Austria show a relatively high activity with 
no clear direction and only a small net loss of HQs (-5 and -1, respectively). For the remaining 
European countries, the flow is comparably small, and HQ inflows approximately equal HQ 
outflows. We also identify 12 relocations of HQs shifting from non-European countries to Europe 
and 19 relocations from Europe to non-European countries. A total of 55% of all relocations occur 
in the manufacturing sector, 20% in the service sector, 15% in trade, and 10% in the finance sector. 
Table 1 shows the correlation matrix. The dataset does not suffer from severe 
multicollinearity issues. The variance inflation factors (VIF) are below the critical threshold of 10 
for all variables (O’Brien, 2007). The tolerance does not fall below 0.1 (Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
 
Table 2 reports the definitions and descriptive statistics for the variables used, and Table 3 
compares the variable means for the non-relocated units and the relocated units. Based on univariate 
tests, we observe that relocating HQs belong to larger MNCs that are more international and that 
rather have dispersed ownership. Furthermore, relocating HQs are more likely to be RHQs and are 
larger in terms of employees compared to non-relocating HQs. To this end, our data seems to 
reproduce patterns that have been previously observed (e.g., Laamanen et al., 2012; Birkinshaw et 
al., 2006; Benito et al., 2011). Finally, we find tha  relocating HQs are geographically and 
institutionally more distant from both their supervised subsidiaries and their CHQ.  
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on the relocated HQs before and after the relocation. 
HQs decrease their number of employees through the relocation and move to countries with lower 
corporate tax rates, lower employment rates, and higher GDP per capita. Again, these findings are 
in line with the previous research (e.g., Laamanen et al., 2012; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Benito et 
al., 2011). Additionally, we find that HQs move to c untries with almost similar, but more stable 
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institutional quality. Those target countries are geo raphically as well as institutionally closer to the
supervised subsidiary countries; in contrast, they ar  geographically more distant, but institutionally 
closer to the MNCs’ home country.  
 
<<Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 about here>> 
 
Estimation 
We run logistic regressions with 3,467 observations to analyse the determinants of the decision to 
relocate an HQ unit: 
 =  +  + 	 
where yn is the company’s observed decision to relocate, xn is a vector of the variables related to our 
three hypotheses on institutional quality and institutional distance, and rn is a vector of control 
variables. The probability that yn is equal to 1 is the result of the following formula: 

( = 1|) =
exp	( + )
1 + exp	( + )
 
We will report on several robustness estimations further on. 
 
Results 
The results of the logistic regression models are presented as follows. Specification 1 (Table 5, 
Model 1) contains only control variables; Specification 2 (Table 5, Model 2) contains the full 
model; Specifications 3 and 4 (Table 5, Models 3 and 4) contain robustness checks. 
 
<<Table 5 about here>> 
 
 
In our discussion of the results, we focus on the full model (Table 5, Model 2). In 
Hypothesis 1, we predict that a decrease in institutional quality in the host country where the 
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intermediary HQ is located increases the likelihood f HQ relocation. We find support for H1 at p< 
5%. The effect is stable across our robustness test. 
In Hypothesis 2, we investigate the effect of institutional distance between the host country 
of the intermediary HQ and the host countries of the local subsidiaries on the likelihood that the 
MNC will relocate the intermediary HQ to another country. Specifically, we suggest that an 
increase in institutional distance increases the lik lihood of HQ relocation. While the coefficient is 
positive, the effect is consistently insignificant across the various specifications. Therefore, H2 is 
not supported.  
In Hypothesis 3, we investigate the effect of institutional distance between the host country 
of the intermediary HQ and the home country of the corporate HQ on the likelihood that the MNC 
will relocate the intermediary HQ to another country. Contrary to H2, we expect that an increase in 
institutional distance decreases the likelihood of HQ relocation. We find a negative effect that is 
highly significant at the 5% confidence level. Henc, H3 is supported.  
The control variables produce the following results. On the level of the host country of the 
intermediary HQ, we find that a higher employment rate and a higher GDP per capita increase the 
likelihood of HQ relocation. On the MNC parent-level, the analysis suggests that larger MNCs with 
dispersed ownership and no recent M&A activities are more likely to relocate their intermediary 
HQs. On the HQ-level, we find that smaller HQs with a high geographical distance to their 
corporate HQs and their subsidiaries are more likely to be relocated.  
We conducted several robustness checks. First, we used robust-cluster and robust year-
cluster standard errors for our estimations. The results of the models are consistent, with similar 
coefficients and significances (see Table 5, Models 3-4). Second, we used different time horizons to 
measure our institutional change variables. While our main model (Table 5, Model 2) was based on 
changes over three years before relocation, we ran robustness tests by using the last five years 
before relocation. Again, the results are qualitatively identical. Third, we changed the specification 
of our institutional quality measure. We used the non-logged versions in one set of robustness tests, 
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and, in another set, we followed previous IB studies that used only the level of corruption as a 
proxy of institutional quality (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Zhao, Kim, & Du, 2003). For the latter test, 
we used ICRG’s corruption indicator. Our main results are again supported.  
 
Discussion  
The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of change in national institutions and institutional 
distance as the antecedents of the decision to relocat  intermediary HQs. We show that a decrease 
in the institutional quality of the intermediary HQ’s host country increases the likelihood of the 
intermediary HQ relocation, whereas an increase in institutional distance between the intermediary 
HQ’s host country and the corporate HQ’s home country reduces the likelihood that the MNC will 
relocate the intermediary HQs to another country. Contrary to our expectations, an increase in 
institutional distance between the intermediary HQ’s host country and the countries of its 
supervised subunits does not affect the likelihood of relocation. These insights allow us to 
contribute to the literature in three ways. 
First, we advance the emerging stream of literature on HQ relocations. The previous studies 
on HQ relocations have focused predominantly on firm-specific variables, such as the degree of 
internationalization, the size of HQ units, and theconcentration of ownership, or on country-
specific variables, such as differences in wages or corporate tax levels, without considering possible 
alternative explanations. To fill this gap, some scholars have begun to speculate on institutional 
factors as potential antecedents of HQ relocations (Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Benito et al., 2011; 
Laamanen et al., 2012). These previous studies havemainly built on insights from organizational 
institutionalism (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer &Rowan, 1977) and emphasized how MNCs 
may seek to establish or maintain institutional legitimacy by imitating competitors or following 
main stakeholders. However, they do not show conclusive results about the relationship between 
institutions and the HQ relocation decision. To thebest of our knowledge, there is no study that 
explores the effects of changing institutional characteristics and distances on the decision to relocate 
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intermediary HQs. This study advances our knowledge on the impact of institutions and their 
quality on MNC decisions to relocate their intermediary HQs. Intermediary HQs are sensitive to 
their host country’s institutional quality and seek to minimize costs and formal institutional hazards. 
Our results confirm the previous studies that underscore how “good institutional governance” is a 
crucial pre-condition for firm development (Chan & Makino, 2007; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Slangen 
& van Tulder, 2009). Being units of foreign-owned firms, they move away from local governments 
that establish unfavourable policies towards them in unpredictable ways (Rodriguez et al., 2005; 
Slangen & van Tulder, 2009). Weak institutions as well as high levels of uncertainty, corruption, 
and bureaucracy hinder HQs in creating parenting advantage. While new to the HQ relocation 
literature, our findings also extend, on a more general level, the work on offshoring of high-value-
adding functions such as R&D (Bertrand & Mol, 2013; Lewin et al., 2009; Demirbag & Glaister, 
2010). 
Second, we contribute to the literature that links institutional theory to governance choices. 
Although international business scholars know that “institutions matter”, they still do not know how 
they effectively matter (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). While there is much research that investigates how 
the overall level of institutional quality affects firm decisions (e.g., Zhou, 2015; Holmes et al., 
2013; Alvarez & Marin, 2010; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003), our knowledge on the effect of 
institutional dynamics and institutional change on firm decisions is limited (Carney, Estrin, Liang, 
& Shapiro, 2018). Some notable exceptions are the sudies of Kafouros and Aliyev (2016) and 
Driffield et al. (2016) who investigate how instituonal change affects firm performance or firm 
ownership. We extend this research by analysing howinstitutional change affects the relocation 
decision of intermediary HQs. Our findings provide empirical support for the argument that some 
institutional setups provide better support for ownership advantages than others (Carney et al., 
2018). The main tasks and abilities of intermediary HQs include the information processing 
between subsidiaries and corporate HQs (Zhou, 2015), developing local strategic initiatives 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998), and coordinating the interdependent activities of their supervised 
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subsidiaries (Nell et al., 2011). A decreasing level of institutional quality makes it difficult for 
intermediary HQs to fulfil such roles and create a parenting advantage. As an answer to the 
institutional dynamism in the host location, the MNC may decide to relocate its intermediary HQ to 
another country where it will likely derive greater benefit from its ownership advantages.  
Third, our study sheds additional light on the inter al configuration and complexity of HQ 
systems. Recent studies have increasingly focused on intermediary HQs (e.g., Zhou, 2015; Nell et 
al., 2017; Schotter et al., 2017; Mahnke et al., 2012; Enright, 2005). Those units’ special position 
within the MNC between the corporate HQ and the subsidiaries allows us to explore “the rich and 
complex reality of the firm” (Zhou, 2015, p. 290). We show that MNCs carefully manage the 
institutional distance between (1) the corporate HQ and the intermediary HQ, and (2) the 
intermediary HQ and supervised subsidiaries. On the one hand, MNCs seem to favour locations for 
their intermediary HQs that are institutionally distant from their home country to overcome their 
liability of foreignness and to better manage frontline subsidiaries. On the other hand, they try to 
reduce coordination and transaction costs by situating the intermediary HQs so that they are 
institutionally not too far from their home country. This represents a novel finding and extends our 
knowledge, showing how the location decision of parenting activities is influenced by institutional 
differences within the internal configuration of the MNC. 
The effect of change in institutional distance and geographical distance between frontline 
subsidiaries and intermediary HQs is not significant in our study. This insignificant effect might be 
explained by our measurement of the variables. We measure the average distance between 
intermediary HQs and subsidiaries. However, it is likely that some subsidiaries are more important 
than others in terms of size or growth. Hence, intermediary HQs are likely to attempt to reduce 
institutional distance to their most important subsidiaries, while they in turn accept larger distances 
to other subsidiaries. We were unable to capture such fine-grained measures. Nevertheless, our 
descriptive results (Table 4) show that intermediary HQs relocate to countries that are on average 




Implications for Managers and Policy Makers  
This study shows an increasing trend towards the relocation of intermediary HQs and offers several 
implications for executives and managers at the intermediary level so they may more 
comprehensively understand this phenomenon. First, our findings emphasize the need for HQ 
managers to consider the institutional quality of the host location instead of exclusively focusing on 
cost factors (such as taxation) when making a relocati n decision for parenting units. Moving 
intermediary HQs to countries with high institutional quality may increase the parenting advantage 
of the HQs and may bring strategic benefits to the entire MNC. These advantages consist of 
possessing, interpreting and synthesizing local information in a better way to achieve competitive 
advantage, employing, and retaining appropriate staff, and operating smoothly at low transaction- 
and coordination costs due to lower levels of uncertainty and formal institutional hazards. 
Second, HQ managers should neither limit themselves to consider the institutional quality of 
the host location in absolute terms. The dynamism of formal institutions is also relevant. 
Unfavourable changes can dramatically reduce the abovementioned strategic benefits to the MNC. 
Thus, HQ managers should continuously monitor the institutional characteristics of their current 
host location and evaluate institutional change.  
Third, we offer to HQ managers a more fine-grained p rspective from which to make an 
intermediary HQ relocation decision. Our findings highlight the complex nature of modern MNC 
structures and the importance of interdependence among different units within the organization. 
When considering an HQ relocation, managers should also bear in mind the relative institutional 
setup between the corporate and the intermediary HQ locations. Intermediary HQ managers should 
push for locations where cognitive frames, heuristics, and formal rules of the game are different 




Finally, our results offer implications to policy makers who are interested in attracting and 
retaining intermediary HQs. Policy makers should note that MNCs are more likely to choose good 
and stable institutional contexts for their HQs. They should also understand that the relocation of 
HQs overseas could have a negative impact on the economy and stability of their countries with a 
risk that professional service providers, such as bankers, accountants, and lawyers, may also move 
away. Therefore, governments should identify those HQ location factors on which they can have 
some control (e.g., governance effectiveness, economic stability, bureaucracy, corporate tax rates, 
and corruption) and continuously improve them to succeed in maintaining or gaining HQs in their 
countries.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our study is not without limitations. First, much of the research in international business has 
focused on the role of formal institutions and their impact on firm decisions (e.g., Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2003; Alvarez & Marin, 2010). We also focus exclusively on formal institutions, as they 
are found to be more dynamic than informal institutions (Estrin et al., 2009). Therefore, we suggest 
that future research could investigate in greater depth the interplay between formal and informal 
institutions and their joint effect on HQ relocations (Sartor & Beamish, 2014).  
Second, our general understanding of the HQ relocation phenomenon is still limited. In our 
study, we exclusively investigate if a certain interm diary HQ is relocated. We do not explicitly 
identify to where the HQ has moved. While our descriptives in Table 4 allow for some insights into 
this matter, future research should address this ‘where’-question so that we can develop a better 
understanding of the target countries of HQ relocati ns. Moreover, scholars have paid little 
attention to the HQ relocation process and the consequences of HQ relocations on the performance 
of MNCs (Nell et al., 2017). Future studies, both theoretically and empirically, could contribute to a 
more holistic understanding of this recent phenomenon.  
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Third, future research could add more complexity to our theoretical framework by adding a 
different research context. For example, current ins itutional events, such as Brexit or the current 
shift towards more protectionist policies, are increasing institutional instability with an increase in 
HQ relocation announcements. It might be interesting to investigate these effects on the relocation 
decision. It could also be highly promising to investigate the phenomenon of HQ relocations in 
emerging markets, as those countries offer more variance in terms of their national governance 
systems, their institutional heterogeneity, and their economic conditions. 
Lastly, as suggested by Carney et al. (2018), the institutional configurations of countries 
have important effects on MNC performance and locati n decisions, and they “should be 
considered in addition to measures of institutional distance as a component of host country location 
(L) advantage” (Carney et al., 2018, pp. 2). Future studies could take this configuration perspective 
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix and Summary Statistics. 
 
 
Notes: N = 3,467. Correlations in bold are statistically significant at p < 0.05. In the regression model, we also control for industries based on the first digit of the SIC code 
classification. Abbreviations: Avg. = Average; Inst. = Institutional. 
a Log value.  
b Absolute value. 
c Lagged by one year. 
 
  
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Decrease in Institutional Qualitya,b 1.000                
2 Increase in Avg. Inst. Distance to Subsidiariesa 0.397 1.000               
3 Increase in Inst. Distance to CHQa 0.307 0.328 1.000              
4 Institutional Qualityc -0.246 -0.132 -0.079 1.000             
5 Corporate Tax Ratea,c 0.235 0.158 0.096 -0.239 1.000            
6 Employment Ratea,c -0.128 -0.204 -0.103 0.746 -0.454 1.000           
7 GDP per Capitaa,c -0.189 -0.137 -0.065 0.430 -0.494 0.423 1.000          
8 MNC Sizea,c -0.030 -0.053 -0.080 -0.012 -0.045 0.024 0.032 1.000         
9 Degree of Internationalizationa,c -0.031 -0.040 -0.093 0.018 0.005 0.016 0.014 0.283 1.000        
10 M&A Activity -0.003 -0.030 -0.016 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 1.000       
11 Ownership Concentrationc -0.013 -0.003 -0.024 0.011 0.013 0.001 0.001 -0.044 -0.045 0.002 1.000      
12 HQ Sizea,c 0.018 0.008 0.019 -0.021 0.004 -0.015 -0.031 0.164 -0.295 -0.004 0.038 1.000     
13 RHQ -0.013 0.006 0.009 -0.001 -0.009 -0.009 0.012 -0.018 -0.028 -0.026 -0.010 -0.010 1.000    
14 Trend Industry -0.124 -0.141 -0.133 -0.039 -0.128 0.075 0.147 0.067 0.104 0.007 0.013 0.014 0.005 1.000   
15 Geographical Distance from CHQa 0.003 0.025 0.306 -0.042 0.001 -0.053 0.300 -0.135 -0.337 -0.015 -0.006 0.044 0.075 -0.075 1.000  
16 Avg. Geographical Distance from Subsidiariesa  0.014 -0.008 0.021 -0.045 0.104 -0.038 -0.112 -0.008 -0.017 0.003 0.008 -0.001 -0.054 -0.009 0.015 1.000 
                  
 Mean 0.058 0.049 0.041 4.492 3.319 4.239 10.547 8.169 0.202 0.168 0.606 4.884 0.513 10.631 4.378 7.103 
 Std. Dev. 0.106 0.093 0.104 0.492 0.299 0.078 0.141 1.249 0.103 0.374 0.489 1.051 0.500 5.287 3.445 0.664 
 Min 0 0 0 2.733 0 3.987 9.683 0.693 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Max 0.758 0.798 0.903 5.333 3.761 4.388 11.423 13.348 0.622 1 1 10.103 1 21 9.822 9.338 
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a Log value.  
b Absolute value. 
c Lagged by one year. 
Variables Definition Source 




Main independent variables   
 Decrease in Institutional Qualitya,b Absolute deterioration of institutional quality in 
the intermediary HQ country over a three-year 
period (five-year period for robustness test) 
ICRG 
 Increase in Avg. Inst. Distance to 
Subsidiariesa 
Increase in average institutional distance between 
intermediary HQ country and subsidiary countries 
over a three-year period (five-year period for 
robustness test) 
ICRG 
 Increase in Inst. Distance to CHQa Increase in institutional distance between CHQ 
country and intermediary HQ country over a three-
year period (five-year period for robustness test) 
ICRG 
Country-level variables    
 Institutional Qualityc Level of institutional quality in intermediary HQ 
country one year before relocation 
ICRG 
 Corporate Tax Ratea,c log(corporate tax rate in intermediary HQ country 
before relocation) 
OECD 
 Employment Ratea,c log(employment rate in intermediary HQ country 
before relocation) 
OECD 
 GDP per Capitaa,c log(GDP per Capita in intermediary HQ country 
before relocation) 
OECD 
MNC parent-level variables   
 MNC Sizea,c log(number of MNC employees) Orbis 
 Degree of Internationalizationa,c log(foreign MNC revenue/total MNC revenue) Orbis 
 M&A Activity Equals 1 if MNC was involved in M&A activity in 
the last three years (1,0) 
Osiris 
 Ownership Concentrationc Equals 1 if MNC ownership is concentrated, i.e., 





First digit of the SIC code classification (from 1 to 
8) 
Orbis 
HQ-level variables   
 HQ Sizea,c log(number of HQ employees) Orbis 
 RHQ Equals 1 if the HQ is an RHQ (0 = DHQ) Orbis 
 Trend Industry Accumulated HQ relocations in the same industry 
in the years before the observation 
- 
 Geographical Distance from CHQa log(geographical distance between intermediary 
HQ country and CHQ country) 
Berry et al. 
(2010) 
 Avg. Geographical Distance from 
Subsidiariesa 
log(average geographical distance between 
intermediary HQ country and subsidiary countries) 





































Notes: Table 3 shows the means for each variable in the group of non-relocated units (N = 3,313) and in the group of 
relocated units (N = 154), as well as the t-statistics for the difference in means. *,** and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level. 
a Log value.  
b Absolute value. 













Institutional variables    
 Decrease in Institutional Qualityb 0.065 0.079 -1.231 
 Increase in Avg. Inst. Distance to 
Subsidiaries 
0.056 0.050 0.547 
 Increase in Inst. Distance to CHQ 0.048 0.054 -0.54  
 Institutional Qualityc 4.490 4.545 -1.351 
 Institutional Distance intermediary HQ 
– Subsidiariesc 
0.185 0.264 -1.577 
 Institutional Distance CHQ –
intermediary HQc 
-0.021 -0.194 3.464*** 
Country-level variables    
 Corporate Tax Ratec 27.700 27.351 0.621 
 Employment Ratec 68.503 69.762 -2.875*** 
 GDP per Capitac 38,400 40,364 -3.650*** 
MNC parent-level variables    
 MNC Sizec 8,503 64,557 -19.360*** 
 Degree of Internationalizationc 0.227 0.309 -7.446*** 
 M&A Activity 0.172 0.084 2.853*** 
 Ownership Concentrationc 0.620 0.318 7.545*** 
 Industry 
   1 
   2 
   3 
   4 
   5 
   6 
   7 




























HQ-level variables    
 HQ Sizec 218.734 466.065 -5.441*** 
 Number of subsidiaries under the 
control of the HQ 
4.733 5.300 -4.164*** 
 RHQ 0.508 0.630 -2.968*** 
 Trend 10.648 10.266 0.876 
 Geographical Distance from CHQ 777.930 5,131.864 -38.013*** 
 Avg. Geographical Distance from 
Subsidiaries 
1,507.485 1,835.800 -3.319*** 
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Notes: Table 4 shows the means for each variable before and after the HQ relocation (N = 154). 
a Log value.  
b Absolute value. 
c Lagged by one year.  
Variables Mean value before 
relocation 
 
Mean value after 
relocation 
 
Institutional variables   
 Institutional Qualityc 4.545 4.466 
 Change in Institutional Quality -0.052 -0.025 
 Avg. Institutional Distance intermediary HQ – Subsidiariesb,c 0.264 0.185 
 Institutional Distance CHQ – intermediary HQb,c -0.194 -0.115 
Country-level variables   
 Corporate Tax Ratec 27.351 20.675 
 Employment Ratec 69.762 66.791 
 GDP per Capitac 40,364 42,948 
HQ-level variables   
 HQ Sizec 466.065 270.740 
 Geographical Distance from CHQ 5,131.864 6,489.662 
 Avg. Geographical Distance from Subsidiaries  1,835. 00 1,477.908 
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Notes: *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
a Log value. b Absolute value. c Lagged by one year. 
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Nr. of Observations 3,467 3,467 3,467 3,467 
Pseudo R² 0.382 0.389 0.389 0.389 
